It has been a long time, but here’s the second part of the Burma discussion I started sometime ago…

 Now, why doesn’t the military not want to work with the NLD?  

The answer, I think, lies in the way the junta and the NLD sought to legitimize themselves. The junta took control of the country by cracking down on the pro-democracy movement. A natural extension of this was to legitimize itself through “outlawing” or “de-legitimizing” the pro-democracy groups. Likewise, the NLD tried to legitimize itself by de-legitimizing the military government, which had ascended to power by cracking down on pro-democracy groups. Throughout the 1990s, both groups spent more time and energy attacking each other than seeking a means of cooperation. Government officials and media portrayed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a person who did not cherish her own race or nationality, for she was then married to a British academic, Dr. Michael Aris. In retaliation, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leading NLD members labeled military leaders as fascists. A leading NLD member was even quoted as saying that some senior military officers might face court martial after the NLD took control of the country. The upshot was that they were unable to find any grounds for mutual trust, let alone cooperation. With the release of the election results, some retired politicians advised leading NLD members to work for the formation of a national unity government together with the military and ethnic minority groups. Enraged at the mistreatment of NLD members by the junta, the then NLD leaders rejected the idea of working with the junta and called for the complete transfer of power. The junta, for its part, was not prepared to transfer power to the party which incurred its hostility. Thus, it has continued to hold onto power by refusing to honor the results of the election.   

 

Why did the military finally decide to have dialogue with the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi?

 Many Burma watchers attributed a change in the junta’s policy towards the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to Western economic sanctions against Burma. The junta could not afford to ignore western sanctions, especially following the Asian financial crisis. The western economic sanctions kept major MNCs away from Burma, thereby making it almost impossible for the country to overcome economic difficulties without western financial assistance and investment. The growing economic difficulties in the country, in turn had the potential to stir up looting and riots. However, according to a well-placed source, the junta was more concerned with the financial shortage in modernizing the Tatmadaw than the potential threats of lootings and riots. Why did the junta have to worry about modernizing the Tatmadaw when it did not need state-of-the-art weaponry to deal with the political opposition? According to the same source cited above, it might have something to do with its distrust and fear of the Thai army. Both Thailand and Burma have their own reasons not to trust each other. The Burma military government was particularly disgruntled with the Thai-American joint-military exercise along the Thai-Burma border. The uneasy situation along the Thai-Burma border would intensify whenever Thai-American military exercises were in progress. A few months ago, Thai border forces allegedly fired at Burma border soldiers at the time of a Thai-American joint-military exercise, known as Cobra Gold. In all probability, its keen desire of preventing the US forces of having any excuse or opportunity to encroach upon Burma territory resulted in the Burma military’s purported refusal to return fire on the Thai army. Speculations were rife that had Burma been ruled by a democratically elected government, it would not have been threatened by the presence of US forces along the border. Prudently, the junta was aware that it could not rely on its biggest supporter, China, in time of emergency, especially since China’s constant regard of Burma as a country of secondary importance. When former Thai defense minister Chaovalit visited China, Chinese leaders gave the Thai mission two million dollars worth of weapons as a gift. However, in sharp contrast, the Burma military mission led by General Maung Aye received only a gift of a million dollars worth of weapons. The Chinese government also asked the junta to pay interest on loans which were initially granted as interest-free. Most conspicuously, although senior Chinese leaders visited Thailand, Vietnam and a few other Southeast Asian countries, no senior Chinese leaders visited to Burma between late 1990s and November 2001. As noted by a local analyst, senior military officers were dissatisfied with the state of their relations with China. According to the same analyst, Burma military leaders knew that they would not be able to improve their relations with Western countries if they did not undertake any political reforms. The junta also encountered some problems in dealing with ethnic minorities. It made ceasefire arrangements with ethnic insurgent groups in order to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the NLD. The junta apparently did not know what to do with the demands made by ethnic groups at the (stalled) national convention. Simultaneously, military leaders did not relish being associated with the ethnic groups engaged in processing and trading drugs. It is, therefore, quite logical for military leaders to assume that if Aung San Suu Kyi were on their side, they could deal with ethnic minorities decisively. Hence, it would not be preposterous to surmise that the junta would want to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the ethnic minorities by making peace with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.  Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest in 2002 differed from the first time she was released in 1995. In 1995, the country’s economy was growing and the junta was in firm control of the country. At that time, the SLORC released Aung San Suu Kyi because senior military leaders believed that they could deal with the potential problems that might be created by the political opposition. In 2002, although there were no political organizations matching up to its coercive power, the junta was considerably weaker, both politically and economically. Military leaders came to the realization that they had to work with Aung San Suu Kyi if they wanted to retire with dignity.  The NLD has been far more conciliatory and flexible since early 2001 than it was in the early 1990s. However, senior military officers warily viewed the propitiatory gestures of the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as lacking because Daw Aung San Suu Kyi continues to call on the international community’s maintenance of economic sanctions on Burma. Despite this, the junta has allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to travel around the country and engage in the reinvigoration of local branches of her party. The junta has also been more tolerant of the activities of the political opposition. Local branches of the NLD were henceforth allowed to engage in fund-raising activities. And since 2000, the government did not take any action against people who were critical if its policies. For instance, comedian Pa Pa Lay was jailed in the late 1990s for performing at Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence. Since his release, Pa Pa Lay has joked about the government on RFA’s Burma language program. The government only went after those who tried to organize open anti-government protests. Therefore, in 2002, many people in Burma genuinely thought that reconciliation between the NLD and the junta was a real possibility.